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a. In the estimation of the Bulgarian military staff, the easiest route into Bulgaria by an enemy of that state [ ] [ ] it was always emphasized that this area was not hilly, but flat, and that an invading military force could move rapidly into the heartland. For that reason military strategists refrained from developing good communications, that is rail and road, in this sector. It was often expressed that if motorized elements ever penetrated the area, it would be extremely difficult to defend against them. As a consequence, although Bulgaria always stationed considerable troops in this sector, her real philosophy did not consider defensive tactics. It was always planned that in the event of war the Bulgarian Army would attempt to take over and control both the Dardanelles and Bosphorus in order to prevent invasion from this quarter. The border north [ ] particularly the hilly sections (as late as 1947) were heavily fortified by long-range artillery and bunkers were constructed at all strategic points. The artillery was spaced and trained in such a manner that the bulk of its fire power was concentrated [ ] The two airfields Stara Zagora and Yambol were the scenes of considerable construction and

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development in 1946 and 1947. It was my understanding that the primary purpose of these fields was to launch air attacks [redacted]

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- b. The importance of the city of Sofia should not be underestimated for in reality it is the key city of Bulgaria, particularly as it relates to Bulgaria's communications system. All north and south rail and automotive traffic of any consequence must pass through Sofia. As an illustration, [redacted] only one railroad from Plovdiv to Shumen and this road is not a direct route. Passengers must change trains several times. Another railway line runs from Varna to Ruse. All other railways of significance pass through Sofia. During World War II the US bombed Sofia. Although the bombings were not extensive, communications and arteries leading from Sofia were cut off... within a space of three months the vast majority of [redacted] Bulgarian industry was practically inert. [redacted]

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[redacted] Consequently, in the anticipation of any attacks from the Yugoslav border, Bulgarian strategy deemed it necessary to occupy the high plateau east of Nish. [redacted]

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[redacted] he who controls this plateau controls all of the western Balkans, that is, west Bulgaria, east Yugoslavia [redacted]

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[redacted] Such conclusions were premised upon the fact that the most important communications of the Balkans are centered within the proximity of this plateau. In addition, our strategists deemed control of the plateau important because a controlling army could move in any direction from it.

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- c. Relatively speaking, the Bulgarian [redacted] border was considered almost impenetrable by the Bulgars. As a result the fortifications in this area were few. Obviously this reasoning was contingent upon the natural geographical barriers which would preclude mass attack in this geographical sector.

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- d. In the event of a Balkan war, Bulgarian strategists agreed upon the immediate occupation of the Belyo More /Aegean Sea/. I heard in various classes that in the event a Balkan war began, Bulgarian forces intended to occupy the Aegean area, the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus regions simultaneously. By such military action it was deemed that [redacted] military forces could be isolated.

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- e. In the north the Danube is considered a natural barrier, one which would be hard to cross. Nevertheless, fortifications were considerable in the Dobruja region. In fact, these fortifications (which have existed for many years) were so developed by 1944 that ranking militarists felt that Bulgaria could hold off invading Soviet forces for six months if necessary. [redacted] the Communist government forbade private citizens to travel within 20 kilometers of the border. This situation still prevails. [redacted]

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